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"The choice is always the same. You can make your model more complex
and more faithful to reality, or you can make it simpler and easier to
handle."
-James Gleick1
Professor Gregory E. Maggs' response to my article, Theoretical
Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Be-
ginning to the End of the National Education Crisis (hereinafter Theoreti-
cal Foundations),2 should, at first glance, please those who value free
speech 3 and a flourishing marketplace of ideas.4 In Innovation in Consti-
tutional Law: The Right to Education and the Tricks of the Trade (here-
inafter Tricks of the Trade),5 Professor Maggs articulates a profound and
lively disagreement with the arguments advanced by Theoretical Founda-
tions in support of an implied positive right to public elementary and
secondary education under the United States Constitution.
According to Professor Maggs, because the methodologies underly-
ing the legal argumentation of Theoretical Foundations do not reflect a
purely originalist way of interpreting the Constitution, these methodolo-
gies necessarily are "tricks," a plying of the con artist's trade with lawy-
erly finesse.6 Professor Maggs also expresses ready skepticism, if not an
* Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. B.A., Case Western Reserve University,
1971; J.D., University of Chicago Law School, 1974. I would like to thank law student Ethan Gross
for his research assistance.
1 JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 278 (Penguin Books 1988).
2 Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundationsfor a Right to Education Under the US. Constitu-
tion: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 550 (1992).
3 Free speech is guaranteed by the Constitution's First Amendment which provides, in perti-
nent part, that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
4 The "marketplace of ideas" metaphor is derived from Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting and joined by Brandeis,
J.); see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 785-86 (2d ed. 1988)
(referring to Justice Holmes' Abrams dissent as the source of the metaphor in American constitu-
tional jurisprudence).
5 Gregory E. Maggs, Innovation in Constitutional Law: The Right to Education and the Tricks
of the Trade, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1038 (1992).
6 Id. at 1039, 1046-55.
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altogether dismissive attitude, toward the practical benefits which a posi-
tive right to education could effectuate in ameliorating the nation's ongo-
ing education crisis. 7 Moreover, seeing in the theoretical and policy
arguments supporting judicial recognition of the right a veritable Don
Quixote tilting at windmills, Professor Maggs belittles the worth of mak-
ing such arguments; he maintains that, in all probability, these argu-
ments will fall on deaf ears at the United States Supreme Court as it is
presently constituted.8
Such vigorous opposition by Professor Maggs may indeed have the
immediate consequence of fueling robust debate. However, as appears
more fully below, in the long run it is highly unlikely that constitutional
jurisprudence, the educational prospects of young Americans, or even
the marketplace of ideas will fare so well should Professor Maggs' per-
spective gain the day.
I. THE METHODOLOGIES ISSUE
Professor Maggs would discern a fatal flaw in the methodologies by
which Theoretical Foundations finds an implied positive right to educa-
tion in the federal constitution. The "flaw" is that these methodologies
are the same ones repeatedly used by the U.S. Supreme Court. In other
words, Theoretical Foundations stands accused of relying upon main-
stream and enduring modes of legal analysis adopted by no less august an
institution than the nation's highest court.9 This is good company with
which to find oneself pigeonholed. Rather than rebut such a criticism,
this author is more inclined to extend her thanks to Professor Maggs for
bringing to the legal community's attention various Supreme Court opin-
ions which, in terms of methodology, lend further support to a positive
constitutional right to education.10
7 Id. at 1038, 1043-46.
8 Id. at 1042-43, 1054-55.
9 Professor Maggs cites the following opinions as symptomatic of the Supreme Court's suppos-
edly erroneous methodologies: Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 390 & n.10 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Johnson v.
Zerbst, 458 U.S. 461 (1938); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
10 Incidentally, I emphatically reject any implication made in Tricks of the Trade that the meth-
odologies which give rise to a positive right to education pursuant to substantive due process doc-
trine must also give rise to a right to own slaves, the "right" recognized in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). See Maggs, supra note 5, at 1049-51.
Professor Maggs would discredit substantive due process, in part, because the Supreme Court
once relied upon it to reach the obnoxious result of upholding slavery. I suppose that, to be consis-
tent, Professor Maggs would also disregard the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
because the Court once interpreted that provision to uphold Louisiana statutes mandating racially
segregated train accommodations. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
It apparently is a matter of indifference to Professor Maggs that Dred Scott, like Plessy, was
effectively overturned and that substantive due process has continued without the Dred Scott opinion
1057
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The ironic and radical nature of Professor Maggs' position on the
methodology issue does not appear to disturb him because he counts
himself an originalist in relation to constitutional interpretation. Profes-
sor Maggs would comprehend the Constitution's text only by relevant
views of the Founding Fathers and the Constitution's framers. Through
this prism, all other paradigms of constitutional analysis, even if they
also include reliance on the Constitution's language and original intent,
are but "tricks" performed by the sly tricksters populating nonoriginalist
scholarly circles or formerly sitting on the Supreme Court.I1  Thus, Pro-
fessor Maggs considers it no compliment to lump the methodologies of
Theoretical Foundations with those of prior Supreme Court decisions be-
cause the Court's opinions that do not conform to the originalist formula
are, in his estimation, just plain wrong-even if they were written or sup-
ported by a host of Justices during different periods of the Court's
history.12
Although Professor Maggs has essentially used Theoretical Founda-
tions as a springboard for expounding the originalist school of thought, a
full-blown debate on the subject is clearly not feasible or appropriate in
this reply. Therefore, on the methodologies issue, I will confine myself to
to support it. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (prohibiting slavery); Id. amend. XIV, § I
(guaranteeing that states shall not deny any person equal protection of the laws); Id. amend. XV, § 1
(protecting against denial of the right to vote on account of race or previous servitude); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I) (holding that racially segregated public schooling
violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 305-08 (1880) (denouncing racial subjugation as counter to equal protection principles).
By Professor Maggs' logic, anytime the Court errs in applying a constitutional doctrine, the
doctrine should be abandoned instead of encouraging the Court to revise the mistaken application of
it. In another context, Justice Joseph Story counseled against just this type of logic: "It is always a
doubtful course to argue against the use or existence of a power, from the possibility of its abuse."
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344 (1816).
11 Maggs, supra note 5, at 1039, 1046-55. Professor Maggs' intolerance toward theorists who do
not belong to the originalist camp and his characterization of their methodologies as unprincipled
manipulations are not unique to him among originalists. Robert H. Bork's defense of originalism
has taken much the same tack. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 15-265 (1990); see also Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork's Grand Inquisition,
99 YALE L.J. 1419, 1420 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990)) (commenting that Robert Bork has embarked upon
the mission of rooting out as "heretics" and "crypto-Marxists" those Justices and scholars who
depart from the originalist orthodoxy); Ronald Dworkin, Bork's Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REv.
657, 658 (1990) (reviewing ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SE-
DUCTION OF THE LAW (1990)) (observing that Robert Bork "accuse[s] a significant portion of the
academic legal profession of being tricksters and cynics who care only for results at whatever cost").
12 E.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion, Powell, J., and
joined by Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(majority opinion, Black, J., and joined by Warren, C.J., Brennan, J., Stewart, J., White, J., and
Goldberg, J.); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (unanimous opinion, Warren, C.J., and joined
by Black, J., Reed, J., Frankfurter, J., Douglas, J., Burton, J., Clark, J., Minton, J., and Jackson, J.);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (majority opinion, Black, J., and joined by Hughes, C.J.,
Roberts, J., Stone, J., and Brandeis, J.).
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three points: (1) locating where, along the continuum between original-
ism and nonoriginalism, Theoretical Foundations is methodologically lo-
cated; (2) highlighting Professor Maggs' own peculiar disregard for
original intent; and (3) briefly exploring the consequences that would at-
tend originalism let loose in the real world of judicial decisionmaking.
As a preliminary matter, the methodologies employed in Theoretical
Foundations should make abundantly clear that its author does not en-
tirely reject consideration of original intent as a guide in interpreting the
Constitution. Rather, Theoretical Foundations manifests an approach
which willingly takes into account any pertinent evidence of original in-
tent as one source, useful in conjunction with other applicable modes of
constitutional analysis and legal reasoning, that may enable constitu-
tional understanding. 13 Indeed, this approach might better be described
as multimodal instead of nonoriginalist since the second term, at least on
its face, connotes an antipathy toward original intent which is not pres-
ent in Theoretical Foundations.14
It must provoke some wonder that Professor Maggs' methodological
critique barely takes notice of the fact that Theoretical Foundations con-
tains a serious exegesis of original intent in relation to a positive right to
education.15 An entire section of the article, Part III.C.3, is devoted to
an examination of the historical evidence that leading framers of the
Constitution, as well as other prominent public figures of the emerging
republic, not only thought education important, but also viewed the fed-
eral government as empowered to play a primary and direct role in the
provision of education. 16
Theoretical Foundations posits that an affirmative constitutional
right to education will impose the correlative power and obligation upon
the federal government to guarantee a certain quantum of education to
the nation's children; in this sense, the right would conform to the origi-
nal intent of the Founders to implicitly delegate direct power over educa-
13 Among those commentators who do not subscribe to originalism, there is variation in the
weight that they would assign to original intent in deciphering the Constitution. Compare TRIBE,
supra note 4, § 1-7, at 10 n.2 (noting that his "treatise is premised on the axiom that the Constitu-
tion-what it says, although not necessarily what some of its authors or ratifiers intended or as-
sumed-is binding law") with Thomas C. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-
KENTr L. REv. 211, 213-14 (1988) (opining that "even when ascertainable, original understandings
have no final authority in constitutional law today") and with Louis H. Pollak, "Original Intention"
and the Crucible of Litigation, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 867, 869 (1989) (presenting "an approach to
constitutional adjudication which respects, but is not overwhelmed by . . . the 'intent'" of the
framers).
14 See Bitensky, supra note 2, at 626-30 (discussing original intent's bearing on the existence of a
positive right to education under the Constitution).
15 Professor Maggs lingers for no more than two sentences upon the original intent discussion of
Theoretical Foundations. Moreover, those two sentences do no more than purport to describe what
Theoretical Foundations says about original intent in relation to a positive constitutional right to
education. Maggs, supra note 5, at 1041.
16 Bitensky, supra note 2, at 628-30.
1059
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tion to the national government. More broadly stated, Theoretical
Foundations demonstrates that the right, instead of flouting the Constitu-
tion or original intent, would fit quite naturally into the constitutional
structure of allocated powers envisioned by the eminent men who con-
tributed to the Constitution's framing and ultimate adoption. 17
While Professor Maggs is correct in asserting that Theoretical Foun-
dations relies upon a variety of nonoriginalist methodologies, it would be
a misconception to think that its author ignored, minimized, or contra-
dicted original intent. The reality is that it is Professor Maggs who here
ignores original intent inasmuch as he fails to furnish any contradictory
evidence of the framers' intentions or otherwise respond to Theoretical
Foundations' exposition on the subject.18
Be that as it may, there are more catholic, far-reaching reasons for
repudiating the methodological objections raised by Tricks of the Trade.
Professor Maggs selects and condemns an array of Supreme Court deci-
sions that he characterizes as representative of the nonoriginalist meth-
odological errors committed by the Justices before the advent of the
Rehnquist Court in 1986.19 Professor Maggs would correct these Jus-
tices by now having the Supreme Court embrace his originalist method-
ology to the exclusion of all other modes of constitutional analysis. 20
Professor Maggs' timing could not be better, for, as he aptly points
out, stare decisis may have a weakening hold upon the Court.21 Yet, the
Court's adoption of his methodological preferences would entail far more
than overturning individual or even whole lines of cases; it would mean
an upheaval on an unprecedented scale that would effectively sweep aside
the methodological foundations for some of the most longstanding and
basic tenets of constitutional jurisprudence. 22 One case, Marbury v.
17 Id. at 627-30.
18 Maggs, supra note 5,passim. Professor Maggs does, at one point, engage in some speculation
as to whether the framers and ratifiers of the First Amendment contemplated a link between educa-
tion and effectuation of the free speech clause's purposes. Maggs, supra note 5, at 1052. However,
Professor Maggs cites no authority supportive of his speculations or indicative of the framers' and
ratifiers' views on this matter.
19 Id. at 1047-54; see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
20 See Maggs, supra note 5, at 1047-55.
21 Id. at 1042 & n.28.
22 It is mentioned earlier in these pages that insofar as originalism is concerned, Professor Maggs
appears to engage in the sort of analysis identified with Robert H. Bork. See supra note 11.
Professor Bruce Ackerman points out that Bork's critique of those judges and scholars who
have not subscribed to originalist orthodoxy "extends backward before Marbury v. Madison, and
unites such disparate sorts as Tribe and Epstein." Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1421. Professor
Ackerman remarks that Bork's categorization of such pervasive and long-lived jurisprudence as her-
esy raises the question:
Why isn't it better to view such an historically entrenched and politically diverse theme [of
nonoriginalist jurisprudence] as part of the main line of American constitutional development?
But Bork is prepared to take on all comers: From John Marshall to William Rehnquist, the
heretics are legion. Each victim must be called to the dock. Each can be condemned only after
1060
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Madison,23 suffices to illustrate the thoroughgoing, if not cataclysmic,
revolution in constitutional analysis that would be triggered if a majority
of the Justices were to opt for Professor Maggs' originalist methodology.
It was Chief Justice John Marshall who penned the opinion for the
Court in Marbury in 1803, only fifteen years after the adoption of the
Constitution.24 It is interesting to consider that John Marshall was a
contemporary of the Founding Fathers and the Constitution's authors
and was advantageously positioned to interact and communicate with
them. Notably, he was Thomas Jefferson's distant cousin.25 He was re-
tained as an attorney by the likes of George Washington and Thomas
Jefferson.26 He and Alexander Hamilton were friends. 27 He served with
James Madison in the Virginia legislature during 1784.28 He was a dele-
gate to Virginia's special convention called to consider ratification of the
then-proposed Constitution and there warmly urged its ratification. 29
And, he served as Secretary of State during the administration of Presi-
dent John Adams.30 Presumably, then, John Marshall was not unfamil-
iar with the thinking and attitudes of the nation's forefathers. Yet, in
Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall may be discovered to
have engaged in those same methods of constitutional interpretation
styled by Professor Maggs as "tricks."
However, before nabbing Chief Justice Marshall at his "sleight of
hand" in Marbury, it is necessary to understand what Professor Maggs
means by "tricks." The "tricks," as defined by Professor Maggs in ab-
stract terms, include the following:
1. "Induction-Deduction Overgeneralization" by which Professor Maggs
means that "the Court first identifies a theme common to several provi-
sions of the Constitution"; "the Court then reasons that the Constitution
protects the subject of [the] theme as a general matter"; and, as a third
step, "the Court uses ordinary deductive reasoning to apply the general
principle to a specific case"; 31
2. The "Magic Term," defined by Professor Maggs as "creating new termi-
nology that proves that the Constitution provides what the Court wants
a representative sample of his or her error is considered. The overall impression is one of furi-
ous dispatch....
Id. at 1421.
Professor Ackerman's comments are equally germane to Professor Maggs' originalism which, if
implemented, would invalidate almost two centuries of Supreme Court precedents and "call to the
dock" those theorists who agree with the precedents.
23 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
24 The Constitution was ratified in 1788. Pollak, supra note 13, at 869.
25 LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 88 (1974).
26 Id. at 88-89.
27 Id. at 136.
28 FRANCIS N. STITES, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFENDER OF THE CONSTITUTION 28 (Oscar
Handlin ed., 1981).
29 BAKER, supra note 25, at 118-36.
30 STrrEs, supra note 28, at 75-76.
31 Maggs, supra note 5, at 1047-48.
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it to provide"; 32
3. The "Means-Ends Assumption," a trick which, Professor Maggs states,
involves the Justices' concealment of "personal preferences in valid-
sounding means-ends analysis"; 33
4. "Informed Wishful Thinking," another "trick" that conceals the Jus-
tices' personal preferences, but which involves "using outside sources to
'inform'-a buzzword in legal scholarship meaning to give content to-
the Constitution";3 4 and
5. The "Perfection Fallacy," which Professor Maggs claims is achieved by
conjuring up the illusion that "if society has a problem, the Constitution
must solve it; and if something is good, the Constitution must protect
it." 35
In Marbury, one of "the most celebrated of all Supreme Court opin-
ions,"'36 the Court held, among other things, that the federal judiciary is
endowed with authority, in a case or controversy, to find federal legisla-
tion unconstitutional, if the legislation contravenes the Constitution, and
to invalidate the offending statutes. 37 The Court, through Chief Justice
Marshall's "celebrated" opinion, reasoned its way to this holding by em-
ploying all five of the foregoing "tricks."
For example, Chief Justice Marshall arguably indulged in "Induc-
tion-Deduction Overgeneralization" by extrapolating the common theme
of implied power of judicial review and judicial invalidation of unconsti-
tutional laws from such facially unrelated and specific constitutional pro-
visions as Article VI, Section 3 (requiring "judicial Officers" to take an
oath or affirm that they will support the Constitution)38 ; Article I, Sec-
tion 9, Clause 3 (prohibiting enactment of ex post facto laws or bills of
attainder)3 9; Article I, Section 9, Clause 5 (prohibiting each state from
imposing taxes or duties upon items exported from that state);4° Article
III, Section 2, Clause 1 (providing that the judicial power of the United
States is extended to all cases arising under the Constitution);41 and Arti-
cle VI, Section 2 (providing that the Constitution and federal laws made
pursuant thereto are the supreme law of the land).42 He then applied the
general principle legitimating judicial review to the case before him by
reviewing and invalidating a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 be-
cause that statutory provision expanded the Supreme Court's original ju-
risdiction in violation of Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
32 Id. at 1049.
33 Id. at 1051.
34 Id. at 1053.
35 Id. at 1054.
36 Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Modern Marbury Myths, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 891, 891 (1989).
37 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803).
38 Id. at 180.
39 Id. at 179.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 178.
42 Id. at 180.
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Constitution.43
Likewise, the Chief Justice substantively, although not literally, re-
sorted to the "Magic Term" by fashioning the concept of judicial review
of congressional enactments, a concept that is nowhere mentioned or
even alluded to in the Constitution's text.44 Nor was Chief Justice Mar-
shall adverse to employing the "Means-Ends Assumption"; he imbued
the Court with the power to review and invalidate federal statutes that
run afoul of the Constitution (the "End") by assuming, as one reason for
the holding, that this power must exist because the Constitution is writ-
ten rather than oral (the "Means"). 45 He chose to endow the Court with
this power; he could have given Congress the power to pass upon the
constitutionality of its own laws. This choice may reflect Marshall's per-
sonal preference "for preserving limited government against the inroads
of an ever more powerful democracy." 46
Finally, in Professor Maggs' methodological universe, Chief Justice
Marshall may also be guilty of "Informed Wishful Thinking" and of the
"Perfection Fallacy." For, Marshall must have used the former "trick"
when he considered what other governments do when faced with legisla-
tion contradicting their own written constitutions,4 7 and relied upon the
latter "trick" to solve the problem society faces when its national legisla-
ture defies that society's constitution. 48
The long and the short of it is that the methodologies that undergird
Marbury, Theoretical Foundations, and the Supreme Court decisions
cited with disparagement in Tricks of the Trade are not tricks at all, but,
rather, time-honored modes of constitutional interpretation and legal
analysis. Were Professor Maggs' originalism to become the norm, the
methodological underpinnings of American constitutional jurisprudence,
from the very beginnings of Supreme Court decision-making, would be
delegitimated and destroyed.49 The result would be the wholesale nega-
tion of stare decisis and destabilization of the adjudicatory function, 50
43 Id. at 173-80.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 176-80.
46 STrrEs, supra note 28, at 91.
47 Chief Justice Marshall wrote in this regard: "Certainly all those who have framed written
constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and
consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant
to the constitution, is void." Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 177.
48 The societal problem created by congressional disregard for the Constitution would be that "it
thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions-a
written constitution." Id. at 178.
49 Indeed, Robert Bork traces the Supreme Court's nonoriginalism all the way back to Justice
Chases opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). BORK, supra note 11, at 19-20.
50 Professor Robert F. Nagel points out that the originalism espoused by Bork "savages not only
exotic judicial inquiries proposed by academics, but also ordinary doctrinal analyses of the sort
judges actually employ every day" and that originalism "calls into question a great mass of constitu-
tional doctrine." Robert F. Nagel, Meeting the Enemy, 57 U. CHi. L. REv. 633, 653 (1990) (review-
1063
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possibly bringing in their wake a society thrown into further turmoil 51
and a Supreme Court shorn of its credibility and dignity.
Nevertheless, with a nihilist's abandon, Professor Maggs prefers to
discard such traditional means of constitutional interpretation and sub-
stitute for them his simplified, two-criteria formula for understanding the
Constitution. The criteria, of course, are the Constitution's text and
original intent. While this originalist formula may have a superficial ap-
peal to those who yearn for theoretical certitude and tidiness, such goals
cannot be attained by this kind of oversimplification. First, the language
of much of the Constitution is broadly drawn and undeniably cryptic52
while dispositive or clear evidence of original intent is, in many instances,
not available. 53
Second, and more importantly, Professor Maggs' simplified model is
not consonant with the process of legal reasoning in the constitutional
context-a process that involves more variables and more sophisticated
logical progressions and syllogisms than originalism would allow. The
Supreme Court's nonoriginalist or multimodal decisions merely manifest
the reality of this complex process. 54 That a positive constitutional right
to education arises from such traditional, more encompassing methods of
constitutional analysis (which, it bears repeating, include reliance on
both the Constitution's text and original intent), only puts the right to
ing ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
(1990)). Professor Maggs' methodologies would have the same effect. See supra notes 22-48 and
accompanying text. Thus, the courts would be left to start from scratch in developing an unsullied
originalism-based constitutional jurisprudence.
51 For example, Professor Maggs argues that Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), was incor-
rectly decided because the Court engaged in the "trick" of the "Disappearing State-Federal Distinc-
tion." Maggs, supra note 5, at 1052-53. Boiling held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment implicitly embraces equal protection principles and, hence, requires that public schools
located in the District of Columbia must cease racial segregation. I leave it to the readers' respective
imaginations as to how residents of the District of Columbia might react if informed that equal
protection principles do not apply to them.
52 Bitensky, supra note 2, at 621-22.
53 Indisputable evidence of original intent can be hard to come by. Dworkin, supra note 11, at
669; see Jack N. Rakove, The Madisonian Moment, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 473, 504-05 (1988); cf.
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 856 (1989) (noting that
"many of the reports of the ratifying debates, for example, are thought to be quite unreliable").
54 See Tom Gerety, The Justice, the Senator, and the Judge: Essays in Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 847, 848 (1989); cf. Ackerman, supra note 11, at 1425-27 (advocating a
holistic approach to constitutional understanding that considers "the implications of the general
themes" of the Constitution); Dworkin, supra note 11, at 675-77 (rejecting Bork's apparent contempt
for "the complexity of contemporary constitutional theory" and maintaining that "the Constitution
lays down abstract principles whose dimensions and application are inherently controversial, that
judges have the responsibility to interpret those abstract principles in a way that fits, dignifies, and
improves our political history, and that... take[s] account of... the work of others who have...
written about those difficult matters"); Pollak, supra note 13, at 869-70 (contending that the Consti-
tution is comprised of a process involving the interaction of live controversies with the words of the
Constitution and with two hundred years of history and judicial precedent).
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education on the firmer, more fertile ground to which John Marshall so
sagaciously led us in Marbury.
II. THE POLICY ISSUE
Professor Maggs censures Theoretical Foundations for taking the po-
sition that an affirmative constitutional right to education could contrib-
ute, in a decisive way, to overcoming the national education crisis. He
suggests that Congress already is empowered to directly regulate public
schools in whatever way it sees fit and that the existence of this power
has not defused the crisis.5 5 While this suggestion reflects neither the
conventional wisdom nor the day-to-day reality of Congress' involve-
ment with education matters, 56 the notion that Congress presently is so
empowered is certainly an intriguing and most welcome concession from
an unexpected quarter. However, Professor Maggs' focus only on such
empowerment misses the point.
Theoretical Foundations contends that, from a pedagogical and pol-
icy standpoint, what is needed is not merely the empowerment of the
federal government but also the constitutionally imposed obligation upon
the federal government to guarantee each schoolchild the minimum
quantum of education necessary to enable the development of the child's
mental abilities to his or her fullest potential. It is the recognition of
such an obligation, as well as empowerment, on the part of the national
government that Theoretical Foundations offers as a new and untried pal-
liative.5 7 Since the reasons why such an obligation would have a reme-
dial effect are fully discussed in Theoretical Foundations, they require no
reiteration here.58
Professor Maggs additionally makes a cursory reference to the no-
tion that further involvement of the national government in providing
public schooling would stifle state experimentation in the education
arena.59 He supplies no data whatsoever indicating that this would be
the case.6A In any event, if the national government were obligated to
fulfill the educational guarantee inherent in the right, experimentation
would more than likely be facilitated at all levels of government. For
instance, infusion of the national government's resources would provide
the wherewithal to fiscally pinched states to experiment with programs
that require more funding, such as programs to reduce the teacher-stu-
dent ratio, to enrich curricula, to extend the school year or school day, to
55 Maggs, supra note 5, at 1044 & n.43.
56 Bitensky, supra note 2, at 626 & n.431. In fact, at present, "[s]tates and towns pay 94 percent
of all education costs." Susan Chira, In Classrooms, the Economy Is Teaching a Harsh Lesson, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1992, at Al, B6.
57 Bitensky, supra note 2, at 631-42.
58 Id. at 632-41.
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modernize school buildings and equipment, and so on. 61
III. THE PURPORTED FUTILITY OF IT ALL
Professor Maggs concludes that, all in all, Theoretical Foundations
is a well researched waste of its author's time.62
He opines that if the intent behind Theoretical Foundations were
merely "to demonstrate the abstract truth of propositions about the Con-
stitution as a matter of intellectual inquiry, regardless of whether the
Court ever will adopt them as law," then the article "ought to concern
itself more with theory than with results. '63 However, as Professor
Maggs himself remarks in a more gracious moment, "The article, indeed,
may contain the most extensive collection of arguments for a right to
education available."64 In fact, Theoretical Foundations is ninety-two
pages long, sixty-seven pages of which are devoted exclusively to an ex-
position of the theoretical bases supporting judicial recognition of a posi-
tive right to education under the Constitution.65
Professor Maggs also finds Theoretical Foundations a pointless exer-
cise because "with the change in the membership of the Court" since
1986, when William H. Rehnquist became Chief Justice, "the practice of
recognizing innovative, unenumerated constitutional rights has dimin-
ished. ' ' 66 Professor Maggs declares with finality that "the time for new
substantive due process arguments, broad First Amendment readings,
and reliance on the Ninth Amendment has ended." 67
This is, in truth, not a very flattering portrait of the Rehnquist
Court. Professor Maggs essentially depicts the Court as bent upon a
rigid, lockstep rejection of innovative implied constitutional rights, re-
gardless of what arguments are put before the Justices. Fortunately, re-
ality does not seem in accord with so fatalistic a vision since, as Professor
Maggs phrases it, this Court, too, has "succumb[ed]" to the recognition
of some innovative unenumerated rights. 68
But, assuming arguendo that Professor Maggs' assessment of the
61 It has been reported that "fjlust when politicians are calling for a revival in American educa-
tion, the recession is leaving principals and teachers across the country with less money for more
students." Chira, supra note 56, at Al. As of mid-February, 1992, at least thirty states were suffer-
ing budget deficits or revenue shortfalls. The result has been that "in many places schools are hob-
bled" such that a variety of educational programs have been eliminated and school facilities and
equipment have been allowed to deteriorate. Chira, supra note 56, at Al, B6.
62 Maggs, supra note 5, at 1038, 1055.
63 Id. at 1055.
64 Id. at 1038.
65 Bitensky, supra note 2, at 563-630.
66 Maggs, supra note 5, at 1043.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1043 & n.37 (citing Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990) and United States v.
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) as cases where the Court has succumbed to recognizing additional
unenumerated rights in the Constitution).
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Court were accurate, does that mean that members of the legal profes-
sion should fall silent because of the Court's preconceived indisposition
to their legal and policy arguments? It seems implausible that the Court
does not even want to hear and think about arguments with which it may
initially or finally disagree. And, even if this Court does ultimately disa-
gree, might not articles like Theoretical Foundations have a persuasive
effect on future Justices of the Supreme Court? Professor Maggs, after
all, concedes that, to date, the Supreme Court decisions addressing
whether a positive constitutional right to education exists have left the
issue "open. ' '69
The intent behind Theoretical Foundations has been both "to
demonstrate the abstract truth of propositions about the Constitution" as
well as to marshal those propositions for the purpose of convincing the
Court that it should recognize a positive constitutional right to educa-
tion. If Professor Maggs is suggesting that the makeup of the Supreme
Court means that I must give up the latter objective as futile, then I
suggest, in turn, that not only our children's education,70 but also the
adversarial system of justice and a bona fide marketplace of ideas are in
trouble.71
69 Maggs, supra note 5, at 1043. Professor Maggs arrives at the conclusion that Supreme Court
precedent leaves open the question of whether such a positive right to education exists based upon
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982), Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986), and, especially, Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public
Schools, 487 U.S. 450 (1988). Maggs, supra note 5, at 1039-40, 1042-43.
70 It bears mentioning that since the writing of Theoretical Foundations, the education crisis
appears to be deepening. See Chira, supra note 56. The most recent studies show that the intellec-
tual development of American children and the future competitive vitality of the nation are in jeop-
ardy. International achievement tests, the results of which were made public in February, 1992,
reveal that in the areas of mathematics and science, the "United States ranked near the bottom."
Barbara Kantrowitz & Pat Wingert, An 'F' in World Competition: A Major Test Shows U.S. Students
Don't Measure Up, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17, 1992, at 57.
Even assuming that a further worsening of the education crisis may be partly attributable to a
situational phenomenon, Le., the recession, the question must be posed whether the health of the
public school systems should be allowed to wax and wane with the impact of the economy's vicissi-
tudes on state and local governments. Leaving matters as they are is an affirmative answer to this
question and is also the end result of Professor Maggs' rejection of a positive right to education
under the Constitution. For, without the right, the federal government has no present duty to guar-
antee that any quantum of education will be consistently provided. Bitensky, supra note 2, at 552-
53, 632-34, 637-42.
71 Professor Maggs evidently desires to discourage even the expression among academics of a
preference for methodologies that do not fully comport with originalism if the objective of those
academics is to influence the Supreme Court. See Maggs, supra note 5, at 1042-43, 1054-55.
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